Abstract -This work proposes a fuzzy multimodal technique capalocating the right key and using it can take as long as ten ble of guaranteeing the desired level of security while keeping under seconds.
I. INTRODUCTION more expensive. Furthermore some biometric sensors, particThe effectiveness of access control systems rests on one im-ularly those having contact with users, have a limited lifetime. portant assumption, proper user identification [1] . This con-In highly sensitive environments, such as military facilities, it dition has been traditionally guaranteed by authentication en-may be necessary to perform strong authentication many times gines checking the user's credentials before granting access (e.g., at random intervals) to prevent identity substitution afto a computer system. For our purposes, authentication tech-ter the initial authentication step. In such a scenario, the auniques can be divided into two main classes: weak and strong thentication system must distinguish between the initial step, authentication methods.
in which it uses strong authentication to identify the user, and
. Weak authentication methods include traditional crypto-the following authentication steps in which the system decides systems that do not identify the user as such. The authen-if its trust in user's identity is high enough to allow the user to tication is based on knowledge, such as a password, or continue to perform the activity she is doing. Multi-modal bioon a token, such as a key, magnetic or chip card. The metric systems integrate multiple authentication techniques. basic problem is that passwords can often be guessed Multi-modality will be important for many security applicaor searched by an attacker and a long, randomly chang-tions, including checking the digital passports of the future, ing password is difficult to remember. For this reason incorporating biometric data that will be probably different smart cards have been introduced which include tamper-from country to country'. In this paper, we propose a multiresistant packaging and special hardware that disables the modal authentication system that combines face authenticacard if it is tampered with or if the number of failed au-tion known for its acceptability with conventional passwordthentication attempts exceeds a chosen threshold. Unfor-based techniques providing high accuracy. In our approach, tunately, these devices can be lost, stolen, forgotten or dis-different trust levels are set for different methods of authenticlosed. cation. When a user gains access to a protected facility, our * Strong authentication methods have been developed to ad-system continuously checks whether the users' authentication dress drawbacks of traditional techniques. 1 While a portrait image will remain a shared element of passports around authentication of an user in a fingerprint reader system the world, the U.S. adopted fingerprint data while the European Union may can take under two seconds, whereas finding a key ring, still opt for iris data for its passports. First of all, we must inquire which authentication devices steepest descent image approach, the algorithm is able to ex-commercially available can be used in our context. Since our tract simultaneously the parameters related to the face expres-system needs to continuously check the identity of the user sion and to the 3D posture. Industrial researchers at Hitachi while she is working, we want it to be the least intrusive as (http: / /www. sdl . hitachi . co. jp) developed a fully-possible. Hence we will not consider devices such as retina, fledged multi-modal system capable of choosing the "right" iris or voice recognition systems, because they would require authentication technique depending on the required security the user to interrupt her activity for a while during the biometclearance level. However, to the best of our knowledge [12] ric acquisition process. Fingerprint, hand geometry and face is the first paper where multi-modality is applied to the prob-recognition express matching between the acquisition and the lem of checking continuously user identity during a working stored template by a number n C [0,1] that indicates the norsession to avoid malicious behavior such as identity substitu-malized number of features that perfectly match the template. tion.
This value is a suitable input for a fuzzy controller. In this paper, we will not deal with fingerprint and hand geometry be-fuzzy inference method, the antecedent block of each fuzzy cause these techniques require devices having a limited life-rule remains the same as in the previous approach, but the contime. More importantly, they hardly guarantee that the person sequent employs a simple equation which takes input variables who provides biometric data is the same that was authenticated into account. Fuzzy inference systems can also be modeled originally. For example, suppose that university students sit using fuzzy rules with singleton consequents. However ([8]), their exams using a computer application without faculty su-limited modeling capabilities of singleton type FIS result in pervision. In such a scenario, identity substitution could eas-more coarse grained results and thus affect the quality of the ily be performed after authentication, with the consent of the model. When applied to trust-based decision support systems authenticated user, even if the authentication system keeps on [8], MA is a more intuitive approach since the output is modrequesting fingerprints. The original user could just stay avail-eled using linguistic variables rather than linear or quadratic able to provide fingerprints when required, while another stu-equations. However, when using linguistic variables within the dent works on the examination paper. On the other hand, in consequent block of fuzzy rules it becomes necessary to perthe case of face recognition a digital camera can be installed form additional calculations in order to generate a crisp output. on the top of the computer display, pointing in the direction In this case, defuzzification requires more computational reof the user. The user does not know if the entire session is sources and can thus result in slower performance compared to recorded or if the camera is used only for an automatic authen-TSK. This is especially true when the fuzzy inference engine tication, therefore malicious behavior is less likely. Of course, contains a large set of rules. Furthermore, MA offers the flexface recognition suffers of other drawbacks such as inconsis-ibility of choosing the defuzzification method more suitable to tent presentation (i.e. different acquisitions may represent dif-the specific application. Finally, MA fuzzy inference engine is ferent poses of a face), irreproducible presentation (e.g. due to more suitable for analytic applications [8] where the decision facial hair growth, a broken nose or wearing eyeglasses) and process must be human-understandable and it is not necessary imperfect signal/representation acquisition (e.g. due to differ-to process a large amount of data. ent illuminations check the il-Mamdani approach with a center of area defuzzification. Exlumination conditions of the room where she is working. In perimental results confirm the goodness of our choice (see this paper, we shall use face recognition as our first (Strong) Sect. VI). The controller's operation is described in detail modality and standard Userld/Password authentication as our in Sect. V. Briefly, we suppose that, after the initial authensecond (Weak) modality. Specifically, when the user tries to lo-tication in which the password is used to limit the biometric gin, she initially inserts her Userld and Password. As we shall FNMR and FMR, trust in user identity is computed on the basee, Userld will be used to select the template to which the sis of i) biometric matching score and ii) password check (acsystem will try to match the face acquisition. cept/reject). If the password is correct and the biometric score IV. A FUZZY APPROACH TO MULTI-MODALITY is higher than a pre-set threshold, the session starts with a cer-
We are now ready to discuss which inference technique best tain trust value. Then, biometric and password trustworthiness fits our requirements. In this section we discuss applicability start to decay and, after a certain time, a new trust value is to multi-modality of two inference methodologies: Mamdami computed. On the basis of this value the system may decide to (MA) [5] fuzzy sets (e.g., "medium", "high") while y is the linguistic output variable (e.g., trustworthiness), Bj is the output fuzzy V. ARCHITECTURE OF THE FUZZY SYSTEM set and M is the number of fuzzy rules.
Our approach includes a trust evaluation process which conIn a MA type inference rule the consequent of each rule is tinuously checks the identity of the user who is performing a also composed of fuzzy sets which are represented as linguistic certain activity. Figure 1 shows the basic steps of our process: variables. For each firing fuzzy rule the output of the rule infer-after an initial authentication, the server can require further auence (implication) will be mapped to its corresponding output thentication steps based on two parameters 1) the level of trust fuzzy set, i.e., the result is described in terms of membership previously computed and 2) the time passed from the last auin fuzzy sets. Finally, in order to compute a crisp output value, thentication. We suppose the first authentication to have been a process called defuzzification must be applied. Popular de-performed using both techniques. Indeed the userID is used to fuzzification techniques include center of area, center of max-choose in the database the template to be used in the matching ima and mean of maxima (see [7] for a review). In the TSK of the biometric acquisitions, because in a matching one-to-one The entire process implemented in our approach is shown
In our model each user authentication can be performed us-in Figure 2 . ing strong or weak authentication techniques. The BIO value At the first step, the information obtained by the biometric represents how the biometric enrollment matches the user's engine, i.e. the value BIO, and the parameter TOK are fed into template. In this approach BIO corresponds to the acceptance a fuzzy inference engine Fuzzy Trust Model in order to calcurate resulting from the matching phase of the face authentica-late a trust value TRUST that expresses the level of trust of the tion process, normalized in the range [0, 1] . The second authen-system in the user's identity after the initial authentication at tication parameter, TOK, corresponds to the boolean output time to. Of course, prior to processing of the inputs, it is nec-(low/high) of the weak authentication system which supports essary to define fuzzy membership functions which define the the evaluation of the trust in the user's identity during the ac-degree of membership of each input parameter in the context tivity. In our prototype we used a UserId/password system. At of the proposed model. Also, it is necessary to define the conthe initial authentication step, the weak technique is involved troller's fuzzy rules. We shall deal with these aspects in the to enforce the biometric acquisition and the parameter TOK, next section. if the authentication successes, is set to high, i.e. equal to 1.
At time to BIO and TOK are initialized; at each time ti Two aging parameters, respectively for the biometric and the (i > 0), the decay rate of these values will depend on the corretoken parameter values, are defined in order to measure how sponding aging parameters. The TRUST value is then defuzzithe system's trust in the identity of the user decays in time, fied through a Defuzzifier engine, using the standard centroidby considering separately two straight lines for BIO and for of-area technique. The output is then fed to another fuzzy en-TOK. The curves are shown in equations 1 and 2, where the gine, Fuzzy DSS Model, to compute the final level of trust. This values Mbio and Mtok represent respectively, the gradient that second engine takes as inputs, together with the trust defuzzidescribes the measurement of the grade of the corresponding fied value, also external conditions, that may become useful straight line; in this approach the gradient is obviously set to in such a multi-modal authentication approach, that consider negative values, since the function has to be time-linearly de-biometric authentication techniques. Acceptance rate may decreasing. Timeline corresponds to the x-axis of the timeli-grade when the lighting is too bright or too dark, or when the ness function, that shows the time t computed as n * A where input facial image for matching is posed at an angle or carries n = [1, oc] is the number of trust evaluations performed by an expression that differs from the enrollment images. In Table   the system and A is the time interval between two consecutive II these context variables are generally named CONTEXT and trust evaluations. Its maximum value corresponds to the overall supposed, for simplicity, with possible fuzzy values "good" session duration. Finally, BIOmax and TOKmax represent, and "poor". The label ALERT represents an alert message that respectively, the initial values obtained at the initial authentica-is displayed on the user's video asking the user to set the lighttion at time to. Then, when time is equal to 0, the BIOmax and ing conditions of the room before going on with the new auTOKmax are equal to BIO and TOK values resulting from the thentication acquisition. The resulting trust of the Fuzzy DSS weak and the biometric authentication systems. At run time, Model is defuzzified again with the standard centroid-of-area BIO and TOK will be set to the values of aging corresponding technique, and the output value is compared with the threshold to the elapsed time t.
of the membership functions of the Fuzzy DSS Model at each time ti. BIOCulrve =Mbi0 * timelinie + BlOmax (1) If the output trust is low the system asks for trust enforcement by going through the Matching phase. In this case the TOKCulrve =Mt0kC * timelinie + TOKmax (2) system asks for a user re-authentication, that can be biometric was closed by the system.
C. Trust Model Rules
The results of two of the experiments carried out are also Each of the two fuzzy models presented in the previous sec-shown in Figure 4 and Figure 6 . In these figures the curves of tion, has been implemented with different rules, in order to the values acquired by the BIO (dashed line) and TOK (dotted control the trust value at each time step ti with respect to dif-line) parameters during the entire period of the user connecferent evolved parameters of BIO and TOK. The fuzzy rules tion are shown, together with the curve of the TRUST values defined for each fuzzy model are reported in Table II. (solid line) obtained during the period of the right permission The Start Trust Model is carried out in order to give a trust-check implemented by the multi-modal fuzzy approach. Figure worthy value depending on biometric and token based accep-5 shows the time curves of the two authentication techniques tance rates, acquired from the Strong and Weak authentication (bio and tok) used in the simulation shown in Figure 4 . Note systems. The TRUST value defuzzified is then passed to the that it is obvious to suppose the weak authentication to decay Fuzzy DSS Model, and the final resulting defuzzified trust-faster than the biometric one.
worthy value is used to decide the next steps during the user Results show some interesting properties of the security syspermission checks.
tem. We describe them on the basis of the simulation shown in VI. PROTOTYPE EVALUATION the system requires to set the parameter A that regulates The Figure 3 shows the pseudocode of the algorithm implehow often the TRUST parameter has to be evaluated. The mented in order to test the performance of our approach.
value of this parameter is application dependent and obSeveral experiments have been carried out by considering viously depends on the security level we want to obtain. different values of BIO and TOK parameters, that result from Simulation results show that it is possible to obtain a good the Strong and Weak Authentication Systems, and the informasecurity (A\ 1 minute) without interrupting the user tion about parameter settings and outputs obtained from some many times and consequently not disturbing her work sig- ing the session, without forcing the user to Interrupt her work ternational Conference on Signal Processing, Pattern Recognition, and too many times. Also, the system can be used efficiently even Applications, SPPRA 2006 , February 15-17, 2006 if the context variables involved in the acquisition are not optipp.lll-116.
